We model a firm's value process controlled by a manager maximizing expected utility from restricted shares and employee stock options. The manager also controls allocation of his outside wealth, which allows partially hedging of his exposure to firm risk. Managerial control increases the expected time to exercise for his employee stock options. It also reduces the gap between his certainty equivalent and the firm's Fair Value for his compensation, but that gap remains substantial. Managerial control also causes traded options to exhibit an implied volatility smile. With costly control the same basic patterns remain, but the manager's risk taking is dampened.
Introduction
In this paper, we have a firm whose value process is dynam ically controlled by an individual manager. That manager holds restricted shares in the firm as well as an employee stock option position. However, he is subject to dismissal for poor perfor mance if the firm's value declines to a lower boundary. The man ager also has external wealth that he can dynamically allocate between a riskless asset and an index fund which is correlated with firm value. He chooses the optimal joint control positions at the firm and for his outside wealth to maximize his expected utility. We examine how his restricted share and option positions influence that optimal control behavior. Typically, he alters firm risk through time depending on firm value relative to the exer cise price of his option and distance to the lower (dismissal) boundary. This makes standard derivative pricing models inap propriate; however once we have identified his optimal dynamic behavior, we can value derivative securities on that controlled process from a market perspective using a risk neutral pricing procedure.
Our analysis relates to a number of previous papers that ad dressed the valuation of employee stock options. 1 We also examine issues regarding restricted shares that relate to the analysis in Kahl et al. (2003) as well as Ingersoll (2006) . The fundamental difference between our model and this previous work is the introduction of dy namic managerial control at the firm level. In some of these papers, there is a ''one shot'' control in that managers can alter the firm's ini tial risk and/or return characteristics; however, there has been no allowance for dynamic control through time. As a practical matter, managers do take sequences of actions over time to ''control'' a firm's expected profitability and risk. Moreover, the usual argument for employee stock options and restricted shares is to provide an incen tive for firm managers to act in the shareholders' interest. Hence, it makes sense to examine how such securities influence managerial control behavior in a dynamic framework and how in turn this con trol changes security values.
Not surprisingly, control at the firm level increases the man ager's personal certainty equivalent value (CEV) of restricted shares and options relative to the no control situation. We are able to calculate the value of control and show that for reasonable parameters the value of restricted shares and options is still far be low the market value of comparable traded securities. This rein forces results from simpler models, without managerial control, which find that employee stock options are a relatively expensive form of compensation due to the large subjective discount be tween the employee's CEV and the market value of comparable options.
We are also able to determine optimal exercise behavior for American style employee stock options with and without manage rial control over the firm value process. The existing literature (without control) shows that an expected utility maximizing man ager will optimally exercise early in situations where it would not be optimal to exercise tradable options. This is also true in our model; however, the manager's ability to enhance the value of his option by altering firm risk also induces him to generally delay early exercise. Typically, he will exercise early but some months la ter than he would without control of the firm value process.
When the manager has access to an external portfolio whose re turn is correlated with the firm's return process, using that exter nal portfolio to partially hedge his restricted shares and employee stock options becomes an important consideration. Such hedging can allow the manager to increase risk taking at the firm level in order to enhance the value of his employee stock options.
A relevant issue is the extent to which the manager's control ac tions incur costs. There are a variety of mechanisms for altering firm risk characteristics and some are apt to be more costly than others. Changing the firm's production technology is apt to incur substantial cost, particularly when it involves alterations to plant and equipment. Similarly, altering a specialized workforce could entail substantial costs. Typically, it would be much less costly to modify the firm's capital structure; however, there would still be some adjustment costs. Also, deviating from an optimal capital structure would decrease firm value; although, there is a belief that the cost of modest deviations is fairly small. Where readily avail able, forward or futures contracts can be used to alter firm risk at rather low cost.
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In what follows, we will assume that the firm is initially at its exogenously specified optimum in terms of operating and financial structure. Consequently, managerial control which deviates from that optimum may incur costs for the firm. For much of the paper, we assume the manager can costlessly adjust risk within specified upper and lower bounds. This simplifies the analysis and allows us to see how the manager would like to behave if adjustments were costless. The situation can be thought of as having some inherent flexibility in the firm's operating and financial structure, or readily available hedging contracts, such that modest risk adjustments are possible at negligible cost. However, major deviations from the optimum, as represented by the bounds on risk taking, are prohib itively expensive. One could also interpret those bounds as limits on shareholder tolerance for risk taking that deviates from their preferred alternative.
We will use this simplified and somewhat idealized structure to explore and compare implications of managerial control with the situation where there is no such control implicitly, the bounds on risk taking are so tight that no managerial risk adjustment is possible. Subsequently, we will allow for risk adjustments within bounds but impose a penalty for deviating from the specified opti mum.
3 Incorporating that penalty dampens the manager's risk tak ing. However with a moderate cost for deviations, the qualitative pattern of managerial control remains much the same as without the penalty. Consequently, intuition from earlier in the paper carries through to managerial control with a modest cost for adjusting firm risk. Increasing the penalty further dampens the manager's risk tak ing; and in the limit, one would approach the situation where there was no managerial control. An important starting point of the analysis is recognizing that a manager's restricted share position typically forces him to hold an otherwise sub optimal portfolio with more exposure to firm risk than he would like. In our model, with control at the firm level, that share position motivates him to reduce firm risk taking. He also alters his outside holdings in correlated assets to further hedge his firm exposure. Adding an incentive option can induce the manager to undertake more risk when firm value is near the option's strike price. The combination of these two effects results in an interesting topography where risk taking and hence firm vol atility vary dramatically depending on the region of the state space.
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Since the controlled process for firm value results in volatility which changes depending on the region of the state space, stan dard option pricing models (such as Black Scholes) are inappropri ate for valuing traded derivatives on such processes. However, we can condition on the manager's optimal control behavior and determine the appropriate risk neutral process for firm value at any point in the state space. With that information, we can cor rectly value derivatives on that controlled process from a market perspective. This includes valuing traded derivatives as well as what the Financial Accounting Standards Board has termed the ''Fair Value'' for a non tradable employee stock option. For traded derivatives, the controlled process results in an implied volatility smile that is endogenously generated and consistent with empiri cal evidence for stock options.
For reasonable parameters, the manager's certainty equivalent value (CEV) can easily be 40% below Fair Value. For a lower level employee, the gap could be even larger due to the lack of control capabilities (by assumption for such an employee) with perhaps higher risk aversion and less outside wealth. As a consequence, our analysis suggests strongly that employee stock options are apt to be a very expensive way to compensate lower level employ ees particularly when such employees have little or no control over the firm value process.
In the next section, we describe our modeling approach and ba sic solution methodology. Section 3 explores managerial behavior regarding risk taking. Section 4 examines the value of managerial control over firm risk taking in terms of its effect on CEVs as well as how it influences the manager's early exercise decision for American style employee stock options. In Section 5, we discuss determining appropriate market values for derivative securities conditional on the manager's optimal control of firm risk taking. Section 6 contains a modification of our basic model where a cost is introduced for deviating from optimal risk taking. Such a penalty dampens the manager's risk taking behavior; although, the same qualitative patterns remain. Section 7 discusses robustness, and Section 8 provides concluding comments.
The basic model and solution methodology
We first describe the stochastic process for the firm's value and the managerial compensation structure. We then discuss the man 2 Bartram et al. (2009) contain a useful analysis which indicates that a large portion of major non-financial firms undertake some derivative hedging, with foreign exchange and interest-rate derivatives being generally more prominent but with substantial commodity hedging in some industries. See also Bartram et al. (2010) for a further analysis of exchange-rate hedging. 3 We thank the referee for suggesting this approach for including adjustment costs related to risk taking. 4 Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) explore incentive effects in hedge-fund management using a related but simpler model without external wealth. There are also related models in Basak et al. (2007) , Cuoco and Kaniel (forthcoming) , as well as Carpenter (2000) which look at optimal control in the delegated money management framework. See also Dong et al. (2010) .
ager's utility maximization problem and standard parameter val ues utilized in our analysis.
The stochastic process structure
We allow the manager to have outside wealth Y, with an initial value Y 0 , that can be invested in an index fund as well as the risk less asset. The constant riskless interest rate is denoted by r. One could think of the index fund as a proxy for the ''market,'' analo gous to the S&P 500 index. However, the expected utility frame work we use is partial equilibrium; and consequently, there isn't an endogenous mechanism to determine a market equilibrium. Ab sent constraints on his security holdings, our framework exhibits ''two fund separation,'' with the manager seeking to divide his wealth between the riskless asset and a portfolio of risky securities. Typically, an individual (the manager) would seek to place some wealth in both risky securities the index fund and the firm's risky technology. However, we will use parameter values such that his desired (unconstrained) risky portfolio exactly matches the index fund; and he would prefer to have no wealth invested in the firm's risky technology. This can be viewed as approximating (in a partial equilibrium framework) a typical firm manager's desire to avoid non systematic risk.
The index fund exhibits lognormal returns with mean m and standard deviation v. The manager can dynamically control his outside wealth allocation at discrete points in time, with a denot ing the fraction invested in the index fund. In general, the man ager's optimal a will depend on not only outside wealth but also the value of his restricted shares and employee stock options, which depend on the firm value X. Hence, a is short for a (X, Y, t). Assume the firm's operating assets are invested in a risky tech nology that generates lognormal returns with mean l, standard deviation r, and correlation q with the index fund returns. Thus, the firm's returns can be interpreted as exhibiting systematic risk via correlation with the index fund and an idiosyncratic risk com ponent. As mentioneded previously, we also assume the manager can hedge (perhaps only partially) the firm's risk from this opera tional technology. Let X denote the value of the firm's assets and j the fraction of those assets which are unhedged. That is, (1 j)X represents hedged assets, which are riskless and earn the riskless interest rate r. Our manager controls j, which is short for j(X,
Y, t).
To provide a benchmark for comparisons, we normalize risk taking such that it would be optimal for the firm to operate at j = 1. As discussed previously, the manager's control of j can incur costs and reduce firm value. We initially model those costs as a step function where risk can be costlessly adjusted as long as it re mains between lower and upper bounds. Beyond those bounds we assume the risk taking costs to be prohibitively high, possibly be cause shareholders would balk at such extreme risk taking or be cause needed real investments in plant and equipment would be extremely expensive. The assumption of costless risk taking within the bounds will be relaxed subsequently in Section 6, where we introduce a linear cost associated with deviating from optimal risk taking.
Managerial control of j will affect firm volatility and the value of derivatives where firm value is the underlying asset. For a given control value j, the log returns on the firm value X are normally distributed over each discrete time step of length Dt with mean l j;Dt ½jl þ ð1 jÞr 1 2 j 2 r 2 Dt and volatility r j;Dt jr Dt p . Presumably, the manager was hired to add value via exercising skill or expending effort in project selection or management. We do not attempt to model such aspects of the manager's employ ment but rather focus on his ability to adjust the firm's risk taking via the relatively simple portfolio structure described above.
We discretize log values for the firm and for outside wealth onto a grid structure (more details are provided in Appendix A). That grid has equal time increments as well as equal steps in the dimensions for firm value (log X) and outside wealth (log Y). From each grid point, we allow a bivariate multinomial forward move to a relatively large number of subsequent grid points (e.g. 31 Â 31) at the next time step. We structure potential forward moves to land on grid points and calculate the associated probabilities by using the discrete bivariate normal distribution with specified val ues for the control parameters j and a.
The manager's compensation structure
The manager owns a non negative fraction b of the firm's shares, which are restricted and cannot be sold prior to T. He also has employee stock options for a fraction c of the firm's shares.
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These options have a maturity of T and are issued at the money. At the horizon time T, the manager's total wealth includes his out side wealth Y T and the value of his firm shares and employee stock options.
6 That is,
We allow the firm to dismiss the manager for poor perfor mance. This is modeled by having a lower boundary on X, where the manager is fired. We denote that boundary by U, and set it at 50% of the initial firm value X 0 . There are a variety of assump tions one could make about the wealth impacts of being fired. Many CEOs and other high level executives have employment con tracts that specify a severance payment in the event of termina tion. If that payment is large, it is often described as a ''Golden Parachute.'' On the other hand, being fired could negatively impact an individual's human capital due to a loss of reputation and make the manager more cautious near the lower boundary. We utilize a middle ground with only a nominal penalty by assuming the man ager's option position (which is out of the money) is cancelled and his restricted shares are immediately liquidated at the prevailing price. If the lower boundary is hit at time s, the manager's wealth at that time equals the proceeds from the liquidated shares and his outside wealth:
That wealth can then be managed until the horizon date T by investing optimally in the index fund and the riskless asset, with the fraction invested in the index fund a no longer depending on firm value. This then determines his wealth W T at the horizon date after having been fired at time s.
The optimization of expected utility
We assume the manager seeks to maximize expected utility of terminal wealth W T and has a utility function that exhibits con stant relative risk aversion c (an assumption that can be relaxed):
5 We will use b + c ( 1 so that his stock and option positions do not represent a significant dilution for outside shareholders. Dilution effects can be accommodated with no qualitative changes in our results. 6 To simplify the analysis, we assume that the manager's cash salary is matched by his consumption and so does not enter the terminal wealth calculation.
For each possible terminal combination of firm value and out side wealth, we calculate the manager's wealth and the associated utility. We then step backwards in time to T Dt. At each possible combination of firm value and outside wealth within that time step, we calculate the expected utilities for all control value pairs (j, a) in a discrete choice set. For example, much of our analysis as sumes bounds on the manager's control of firm risk such that j lies between 0.75 and 1.5, where we use steps of 0.125. For the optimal investment proportion a in the index fund, we also use steps of 0.125 between a minimum value of 0.5 and a maximum of 1.5. We choose the highest of the calculated expected utilities as the optimal indirect utility for that grid point and denote its value as J X,Y,T Dt . We record the optimal indirect utilities, the associated optimal firm level risk taking, and the optimal proportion in the in dex fund for each grid point within that time step and then loop backward in time, repeating this process through all time steps (see Appendix A for further details). This generates the indirect utility surface and optimal control values for our entire grid. 
A set of standard parameters
In the analysis that follows, we will use variations on a standard set of parameters listed in Table 1 . A more detailed discussion of robustness to variation of these parameters is in Section 7 below. There, we investigate changes in the numerical setup, penalties for performing poorly, and comparative statics. Most of the numer ical results change only slightly, and the overall economic story re mains the same.
The horizon is 5 years, with monthly adjustments of the firm's risk taking j and the manager's investment proportion a in the in dex fund. The starting firm value of 1 equals the strike price for the manager's incentive options (employee stock options are almost always granted at the money). If firm value drops below 0.5, the manager is fired. The risky technology has a mean return of 7.6% and a volatility of 30%. The index fund has a mean return of 8% and a volatility of 20%. The correlation coefficient is 0.6 between these two processes. The riskless asset yields 4%. The risk aversion coefficient of the manager's power utility is c = 2. For our standard parameters, we use bounds on the firm's risk taking j of 0.75 and 1.5. Thus our standard parameter structure allows the manager to reduce but not eliminate the firm's risk. He can also increase that risk but in a limited manner. For his outside wealth, we use bounds on the fraction a invested in the index fund of 0.5 and 1.5. Thus, he can short as well as take a levered position in the index fund but is restricted from taking extreme positions. The manager's initial wealth includes his outside wealth of 0.005, a restricted share position that is worth 0.005 (given the ini tial firm value of 1), and his options on a fraction 0.010 of the firm's shares. To provide a sense of scale, suppose the firm had a value of $1 billion. The manager would have $5 million of restricted firm shares and outside wealth of $5 million. His option position is ini tially at the money and given the other parameters in Table 1 would have a Black Scholes value of approximately $3.396 million with no managerial control of the firm's risk taking. As we shall see, the Black Scholes formula does not correctly value the man ager's option position; but it gives us a rough sense of the relative value of that position compared with his restricted shares and out side wealth.
Managerial risk-taking and external wealth management
Before analyzing the manager's behavior in response to an incentive option position, we first consider how he would manage firm risk if he had only restricted shares and his outside wealth. With the parameter values in Table 1 , our manager would opti mally choose to hold no risk in the firm. Absent constraints on his behavior or costs for deviating from j = 1, he could achieve his goal indirectly by fully hedging firm risk (j = 0) and effectively turning his restricted shares into a riskless asset. He would then in vest his outside wealth fully in the index (a = 1).
7 With the lower bound of j = 0.75, the manager cannot eliminate firm risk; but he will reduce it to that lower bound and keep it there until the horizon date (unless firm value declines to the level where he is fired). If he could further reduce firm risk taking, he would do so. Since the manager is forced to bear substantial firm risk with j = 0.75, he limits risk on his outside wealth by using only a = 0.25 when firm value X is high. When X is relatively low, his exposure to firm risk is smaller in absolute terms; and he is willing to increase his external risk somewhat, but with a maximum a of only 0.5. If shareholders want the firm to operate at a higher risk level such as j = 1, they will have to provide the manager with an incen Merton (1969) investor. With our standard parameter values, the Merton investor would optimally invest nothing in the firm's risky technology, place 50% of his wealth in the index fund, and have the other 50% in the riskless asset. Despite holding restricted shares, the manager could achieve that portfolio by reducing firm risk-taking to j = 0 which has the effect of transforming his restricted shares into a riskless investment. With half his initial wealth outside the firm and a = 1, he could thus attain the Merton optimum.
Taking the expectation over that density and discounting at the riskless rate, we obtain that security's market value.
An obvious application of this procedure is determining what the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has called Fair Value for an employee stock option. The FASB has stated that when possible, Fair Value is to be determined from the market price of the same or a similar option. Absent the availability of such a mar ket price, Fair Value is to be estimated using an option pricing model. For standard option pricing models, the firm's potentially non constant volatility (as in Fig. 1 ) is a problem; however, that presents no difficulty for our approach.
Using the standard parameters from Table 1 , our manager's incentive option would have a Fair Value of 0.3073 if it were Euro pean compared with its CEV of 0.1508. The CEV in this case is roughly half of Fair Value. If the incentive option were American, its Fair Value would be 0.2657 compared to a CEV of 0.1753. The lower Fair Value for an American option is caused by the manager's early exercise decision, which is sub optimal (value destroying) in a risk neutral pricing framework but optimal for his personal ex pected utility maximization.
With both European and American incentive options, the differ ence between the Fair Value and CEV is substantial. In either case, the manager would value his option at considerably less than Fair Value. This is illustrated in Table 4 for European options. American options display similar characteristics. The manager's CEV de creases as a fraction of Fair Value for longer maturity options and with greater managerial risk aversion. Having greater outside wealth and hence less wealth tied up in the firm results in an in creased CEV relative to Fair Value. Examining Table 4 , it is clear that options are an expensive form of managerial compensation in that their value to the manager (measured by CEV) is substan tially below their Fair Value. This is true even though control is of considerable value to the manager.
Our approach could also be used to compare Fair Value with the CEV for other firm employees, who do not control the firm's risk taking. Fair Value based on our manager's control decisions with standard parameters would be 0.3073, as shown in Table 4 . The other employee's CEV would be conditioned on our manager's choices regarding firm risk taking but with that other individual's choices regarding investment of their outside wealth and exercise of their option (assuming it is American). It is quite likely that a lower level employee is more risk averse and has less outside wealth than our top level manager, which would tend to enlarge the gap between Fair Value and CEV compared with the already large differences we see in Table 4 . This suggests that using options as a compensation mechanism will be very inefficient unless they have substantial incentive effects. Hence, the use of options prob ably does not make sense for lower level employees due to both less (or no) control and likely a greater personal discount on the option's value.
In the situation we have been analyzing, managerial control re sults in a Fair Value of 0.3073 for a European incentive option which is less than the comparable Black Scholes value of 0.3396. However with a differing managerial incentive structure and/or Table 2 Value of managerial control. We report the certainty equivalent values of an employee stock option struck at X 0 = 1 and using the standard parameters from Table 1 prior to option maturity. Also reducing j below 1.0 occurs at even higher firm values than in Fig. 5 . So increasing the penalty provides further smoothing; although, there are still situations where the manager chooses to move j to its upper or lower boundaries.
We next examine the effect of the manager's altered behavior (due to the penalty function) on his CEV and value of control. Table  5 displays results for a cost of k = 0.02. Those results can be com pared with Table 2 , where there is no cost associated with deviat ing from j = 1. The CEVs with no control are the same in both tables since those values correspond to a situation where (with no control) j is fixed at 1. The values with control are consistently smaller in Table 5 since the penalty with k = 0.02 causes the man ager to choose j values which would be sub optimal for him with out the penalty.
As with the results in Table 2 , the value of control in Table 5 also increases with the option maturity and managerial risk aversion. In Table 5 , we again have the result that a larger percentage of outside wealth increases the value of control in absolute terms; but the percentage effects depend on option maturity. Thus, imposing a cost of k = 0.02 for deviating from j = 1 reduces the value of control but results in similar response patterns as we alter option matu rity, outside wealth, and managerial risk aversion. We have also examined CEV patterns when k = 0.05. The higher penalty rate fur ther reduces the value of control; but we again see similar re sponse patterns as option maturity, etc. are altered. To provide a sense of comparison, the percentage value of control using our standard parameters with no penalty was 37.32% in Table 2 . With a cost of k = 0.02, the comparable value of control in Table 5 drops to 29.21%. Increasing the penalty to k = 0.05, further reduces the value of control with standard parameters to 19.37%.
Imposing a cost of deviating from j = 1 also reduces firm value.
Without such a cost, the initial firm value was 1.0 as specified in Table 1 . With a cost of k = 0.02 and our standard parameters, the initial firm value is reduced by 1.88%. Increasing the penalty to k = 0.05 further decreases firm value, with a total reduction of 2.88%. Both these reductions are based on our standard 5 year time frame.
Robustness
We investigated the robustness of our results by altering grid size and by changing some of the key parameter values from those shown in Table 1 . When we make our grid of states twice as fine (coarse), the CEV and the expected time to exit via hitting the low er boundary change by less than 1% (2%). Making the set of possible kappa levels twice as fine (coarse) changes the CEV and time to exit by 0.01% (0.05%). Altering the stochastic process (to be mean reverting, for example) or using different parameters for the means and volatilities does not change the results fundamentally since the manager can adjust firm and external risk taking rather fre quently. In other words, he can adjust back to his desired risk posi tion at each time step subject only to the upper and lower bounds on the control parameters.
It is possible to induce dramatic shifts in managerial behavior near the lower boundary. For example, the manager could engage in ''suicide gambling'' if a large Golden Parachute made being fired more attractive than having his incentive option finish substan tially out of the money. However, this kind of gambling does not arise with our standard parameters; and a slight dismissal penalty of 5% on the manager's firm related wealth does not substantially change any of our results.
We also considered the impact of changes in correlation, option position size, and risk aversion on the CEV and the expected time to exercise for the American option with 1 or 5 years to expiration. Changing the correlation from 0.6 to 0 in effect makes the firm risk completely idiosyncratic; however, option CEV and the expected time to exercise change by less than 4%.
More interesting is an increase in the option position size. Recall that we are measuring CEV as a marginal value so that it is possible to make comparisons with Fair Value, which is calculated on a per unit basis. Increasing the manager's option position results in a greater total value, but the marginal value for the manager declines with larger and larger option grants. Increasing his option position from 0.01 to 0.10 (a 10 fold increase) reduces his CEV for the 1 (5) year maturity option by 46% (43%) of the result with standard parameters. Also, the expected time to exercise is reduced to 72% (63%) of the value with standard parameters. This indicates the manager is inclined to cash out his larger option position relatively quickly. As one would expect, increasing the manager's risk aver sion coefficient further reduces his CEV and expected time to exercise.
Concluding comments
Holding restricted shares and/or an employee stock option po sition has important implications for how our manager exercises control at the firm as well as how he manages his external wealth. When the manager has only restricted shares, there is a significant incentive problem; and he seeks to reduce firm risk as much as possible. This illustrates both the importance of potential con straints on managerial control and the role of employee stock op tions for inducing more willingness to undertake risky firm investments.
Adding an employee stock option provides an incentive for greater risk taking in the manager's control of firm investment positions. Our standard parameters impose both upper and lower Table 5 Value of managerial control when deviations from j = 1 are penalized at the rate of k = 0.02. We report the certainty equivalent values of an employee stock option struck at X 0 = 1 when deviations from j = 1 incur a penalty at the annualized rate of k = 0.02. Other than that penalty, the standard parameters from Table 1 are used except as indicated below. For the ''no control'' values, the manager's control of firm risk-taking is eliminated so that j = 1 everywhere. Outside wealth is reported as a percentage of total initial wealth excluding the incentive option. bounds on that risk taking, and the managerial behavior in Fig. 1 illustrates the significance of both bounds. The manager's attempts to increase risk in the Option Ridge area (near the strike price) are limited by the upper bound on risk taking. Whereas with higher firm values, the risk inducing incentive from the option declines; and the manager returns to his risk avoiding behavior, which is limited by the lower bound on firm risk taking. When we intro duce a modest cost (penalty) for deviating from the firm's optimal risk level, the same qualitative pattern of managerial risk control remains; however, his risk taking becomes less extreme and more centered around the optimal risk level. There could well be interesting testable hypotheses resulting from the differing adjustment costs across firms for altering their risk. Earlier, we mentioned three potential factors that would strongly influence the costs of risk adjustment: (a) the firm's abil ity to readily alter (at low cost) its production technology and workforce, (b) its ability to adjust the firm's financial structure at low cost, and (c) the availability of liquid markets (with low trans action costs) in appropriate forward contracts or related deriva tives that could be used to alter the firm's overall risk. If one (or more) of these factors characterized the situation of a particular firm, we would expect a lower cost of risk management and poten tially greater variability in that firm's risk profile over time. An interesting starting point might be looking at industries where derivative contracts seem to provide considerable ability to alter risk such as natural resource firms, utilities, and airlines, as well as firms with large foreign exchange exposure. In a related vein, it would also be interesting to see whether firms that altered the incentive compensation structure of top management experienced alterations in their risk profiles. We leave such explorations for fu ture study.
As we saw in Section 3, there are interesting interactions be tween the manager's risk taking within the firm and his control of outside wealth positions. Absent an incentive option, he tries to indirectly reduce the risk of his overall portfolio by decreasing the firm's risk. He then partially hedges his remaining firm expo sure by reducing the fraction of outside wealth invested in a corre lated asset. Introducing an employee stock option dramatically increases the hedging impact on outside wealth positions. That behavior is further amplified by managerial control of firm risk. We view further exploration of such behavior as an interesting to pic for future research.
It is not surprising that control allows the manager to increase his CEV for firm options and for restricted shares. What seems more significant is the potentially substantial delay in early exer cise introduced by control. This is consistent with empirical results in Bettis et al. (2005) who find that CEOs tend to exercise their op tions about 4 months later than other senior executives and 6 months later than non management directors. They view these re sults as due to CEOs tending to have greater outside wealth and possibly less risk aversion. However, many outside (non manage ment) directors are CEOs of other firms and apt to have a relatively large proportion of their wealth outside the firm under study. Un less they are generally more risk averse, this would suggest observ ing non management directors exercising later than the firm's CEO. Our model provides an explanation for the above exercise timing based on differing control abilities, with CEOs having the most control and non management directors the least. One would expect all three factors (outside wealth, risk aversion, and control capability) to play roles in the exercise decision; however, control differences could generate the exercise behavior observed by Bet tis, Bizjak, and Lemmon.
Once we have determined the manager's optimal control at the firm, we can value derivatives on that controlled process from a market perspective. This allows us to calculate the Fair Value for his employee stock option position as well as for traded options based on firm value. In addition to showing how to calculate traded option values for a controlled process, we observe that the man ager's control behavior endogenously leads to a volatility smile or skew consistent with empirical observations. This represents a further piece of empirical evidence supporting the model.
Regarding Fair Value, there are a couple of important results. First, control of firm risk taking has substantial value for the man ager; however, the gap between his CEV and Fair Value can be quite large. Our results suggest it can easily be 40% or more. Hence, managerial control does not appear to come anywhere close to eliminating the substantial gap between a firm's cost of employee stock options (as measured by Fair Value) and the manager's per sonal valuation (as represented by his CEV). Second, that gap is likely to be much larger for lower level employees who are apt to have less outside wealth and may be more risk averse. More over, when such employees have no control over firm risk taking, granting them options can not influence firm risk. Consequently, our model strongly suggests that option based compensation is likely to make sense only for employees that can substantially influence the firm value process. malization constant so that the computed probabilities sum to one:
We keep a lookup table of the probabilities for different choices of j and a, where we combine each possible j choice with each pos sible a choice. In our standard case, we vary j from 0.75 to 1.5 in steps of 0.125 and a from 0.5 to 1.5 in steps of 0.125. The ends of these ranges are problematic and can result in poor approxima tions to the normal distribution. For low kappa or alpha values, the approximation suffers from not having fine enough value steps. For high kappa or alpha values, the difficulty arises from potentially not having enough offset range to accommodate the ex treme tails of the distribution. We use Dðlog XÞ Dðlog YÞ ½logð1=0:5Þ=40 % 0:0173 in order to achieve sufficiently accurate distributions given the step size of 0.125 in both j and a. Further more, the offset of ±15 allows moves to 31 Â 31 = 961 surrounding grid points at each time step and insures that all tail probabilities are reasonably approximated.
We now calculate the expected indirect utilities after initializ ing the terminal indirect utilities J X,Y,T to the utility of wealth of our manager U X,Y,T (W T ), where his wealth W T is determined by Y T as well as X T and his compensation scheme. Our next task is to cal culate the indirect utility function at earlier time steps as an expec tation of future indirect utility levels. We commence stepping backwards in time from the terminal date T in steps of Dt. At each grid point within a time step t, we calculate the expected indirect utilities for all combinations of kappa and alpha levels using the stored probabilities and record the highest value as our optimal indirect utility, J X,Y,t . We continue, looping backward in time through all time steps.
In our situation, using a lookup table for the probabilities asso ciated with the combinations of kappas and alphas has two advan tages compared with using an optimization routine to find the optimal combination of kappa and alpha. For one, lookups are fas ter although coarser than optimizations. Second, a sufficiently fine lookup table is a global optimization method that will find the true maximum even for non concave indirect utility functions. In such situations, a local optimization routine can get stuck at a local maximum and gradient based methods might face difficulties due to discontinuous derivatives.
When implementing our backward sweep through the grid, we have to deal with behavior at the boundaries. The terminal step is trivial in that we calculate the terminal utility from the terminal wealth. The lower boundary in firm value, which we reach in 40 steps from the initial firm value of 1.0, is also quite straightfor ward. We stop the process upon reaching or crossing the boundary and calculate the utility associated with hitting the boundary at that time s. In that situation, the manager's wealth has the known value of W s = bX s + Y s . As a side calculation we work out the indi rect utility of a pure wealth account that can be optimally invested in the index fund and the riskless security until time T. We use the same parameter values as in Table 1 . Finally, we look up the inter polated indirect utility of W s . For increased accuracy, we interpo late the certainty equivalent values which are almost linear in wealth.
For the numerical implementation, we also need upper bound aries to approximate indirect utilities associated with high firm values and high outside wealth levels. We use a boundary at least 40 steps above the initial X 0 and Y 0 levels and such that we can al ways accommodate at least a three standard deviation up move for the unhedged firm value or the index fund. For firm values near that boundary, our calculation of the expected indirect utility will try to use indirect utilities associated with firm values above the boundary. We deal with this by keeping a buffer of firm values above the boundary so that the expected indirect utility can be cal culated by looking up values from such points. We set the terminal buffer values simply to the utility for the wealth level associated with those firm values. We then step back in time and use as our indirect utility the utility just below the boundary times a multi plier. This multiplier is based on the ratio of indirect utilities above the upper boundary to the indirect utility just below the upper boundary one time step later. Thus, we will always be able to cal culate such a multiplier as we solve backward through the state space. We assume that this multiplier does not change from one time step to the next. This approach is potentially sub optimal, which biases the results low. However, the method works very well and the distortions rarely ripple more than a single step below the upper boundary, affecting mainly the early time steps.
To allow for early exercise, we use another side calculation to construct an optimal indirect utility surface (for all states and time steps) conditional on having exercised at the firm value X s and the outside wealth level Y s . Then, we work out the optimal final indi rect utility surface, determining at each node whether or not it is preferable to exercise. We start at time T with a live option and work backward. We compare the indirect utility of continuing with a live option to the indirect utility of early exercise. The outside wealth conditional on exercising is then c(X s X 0 ) + Y s and we find the indirect utility at that outside wealth level on the side calcula tion surface. Here again, we interpolate linearly in the certainty equivalents across wealth for increased accuracy. If early exercise is preferred, we insert that indirect utility at the relevant node and continue looping backwards to the beginning of the grid. 
